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Introduction: liberté, égalité – et fraternité? 
 
This paper connects two fundamental topics in political philosophy and development 
ethics: the role of feelings in public life, and the nature and provision of public goods. 
It links philosophical discussions of publicness and compassion in policy with the 
more policy-practical topics of public goods. ‘Publicness’ is used here as an umbrella 
term for the moral sentiments that sustain the structures of cooperation and 
solidarity seen in a society. The term helps us to consider the connections between 
public goods, public information, public reason and people’s values and cultures.  
We will put forward a conceptualization of priority (or ‘basic’) public goods, 
and of public values required to induce support for provision of those goods. This 
leads to, centrally, an appraisal of Martha Nussbaum’s notable recent study of 
political emotions. We will refer to other research on value commitments, and to the 
global as well as the national scale, including from discussions of human security and 
human rights.  
 The provision of public goods is at the heart of much of human development. 
The extent of such provisions is an indication of a society’s normative priorities, yet 
not much attention is usually given in economic development theory and even 
human development theory to how these priorities are established as an expression 
of the quality of public commitment or public spirit in a society. While the importance 
of individualism for economic growth and human development has been widely 
argued, and the relevance of ‘social capital’ has become fashionable in social 
sciences since the 1990s, what of publicness? How can we understand its importance 
to human development? Is ‘public spirit’ part of ‘social capital’? Contemporary 
deliberative ethics talks much more about public reason and dialogue than about 
public sentiments and commitment (see e.g. Crocker 2008, Sen 2009).i 
Development theorists of the 1940s to 1970s do not seem to have given much 
attention to the theme of publicness, except in some discussions of nation-building 
and corruption in relation to perceptions of what are public and private spheres (see 
e.g. Goulet 1971, Gasper 2006a). Some hints appear in 1970s and 80s discussions of 
human needs, and in participatory theories of development since the 1990s. The 
human development work inspired by Amartya Sen has also led in this direction, 
including in Sen’s books with Jean Drèze; but much capability approach work has 
been limited by weak elaboration of social and psychological dimensions. According 
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to the anthropologist Mary Douglas it reflected a social sciences weakness of ‘Missing 
[real] Persons’ (Douglas and Ney 1998). Sen’s category of ‘commitment’, meaning 
holding of objectives oriented to the good of others, remains a relatively empty box 
in his system, not presented as foundational in the same way as the categories of 
freedom and equality. His work has ventured relatively little into the substantive 
contents and social determinants of commitment, compassion, fraternity and 
solidarity.ii 
A new survey of the BRICS countries (Anand et al., forthcoming) examines 
many dimensions of their economic rise and their degrees of accompanying political, 
social and cultural evolution. Has growing economic wealth been matched by growth 
of values and institutions that build and secure an equitable and decent society? 
Comim (2015) distinguishes, first, a ‘Senian level’, concerning persons’ degree of 
effective access to basic or priority functionings; this partly rests on, second, a 
‘Rawlsian level’, concerning state support for the provision, whether by state or other 
actors, of primary or basic goods; and both partly depend on, third, a ‘Nussbaumian 
level’, concerning the public culture of mutual respect and concern needed to sustain 
basic goods, effective access and a society that promotes a life with dignity for all. 
Comim operationalizes these levels through reference to relevant indicators; and 
presents a composite index spanning the three, which is applied to the five BRICS.iii 
The results are striking: an enormous gulf between the measures for overall 
publicness (reflecting public provisions, attainments, and indications of mutual 
concern) in Brazil, China and Russia versus South Africa and, especially, India.iv 
While the indicators for each of the levels are subject to debate, likewise the data 
used and the principles of aggregation, the gulf is so extreme that fundamental 
questions arise, including about the bases of identification in pluralist societies.  
Whereas pluralism has been widely praised by leading human development 
theorists (Nussbaum, 2006; Sen, 2009), much remains to be said about the collective 
and cultural processes that shape publicness in different societies and about its roles 
in human development. Not least, the links between market processes and barriers 
to deeper communication between individuals have so far been largely ignored, 
warned Evans (2002).   
 We will look later in this paper at India, perhaps the main target in Sen’s 
discussions of public reason and (together with the USA) in Nussbaum’s discussions 
of political or public emotions. India already has a much higher average per capita 
income than did many other countries (such as China, Korea, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, 
Thailand) when they initiated effective programmes for universal access to various 
basic public goods. CES (2014) documents India’s continuing failures in provision of 
basic public goods at the ‘Rawlsian level’, and generates questions about Indian 
political culture(s) and the weakness of values of public compassion-in-action. 
Mander’s book Looking Away (2015) explores these values, arguing that increasing 
marginalization of vulnerable people has been accompanied by growing ideologies of 
possessive exclusivism that justify the marginalization. 
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The focus of the paper is however not a country case, but how authors 
conceptualize (or ignore) the dimensions and challenges of publicness, mutually 
concerned cooperative interaction. Could we explain publicness just as a product of 
individual choices, subject to strategic voting, manipulation, collective agency 
problems and so on? Much work of this nature considers people’s moral sentiments 
as an outcome of individual preference orderings (Pattanaik, 2014), ignoring agents’ 
socialization and the origins of their motives and emotions. Nussbaum's Political 
Emotions offers a deeper treatment; it employs a complex theory of emotions and 
draws from a range of historical experiences. It remains mainly at the level of 
philosophical and literary value discourse, with limited attention to the political 
challenges of building coalitions and even new identities around and for public 
priority goods, as in arenas like sanitation (cf. Wuyts 1992), let alone across national 
boundaries; but includes helpful case studies including from city planning, the 
American New Deal, and Gandhi’s strategy as a social reformer. By not merely 
pointing to the need for a social psychology of emotions but starting to offer one, 
Nussbaum’s work generates many essential further questions. 
In our discussion of this core area for development ethics and human 
development we attempt, in the spirit of David Crocker’s work, to bring together 
diverse sources in philosophy, social sciences and policy analysis, and to introduce 
global and not only domestic perspectives. The paper cannot itself go far on many of 
the issues it raises; but it raises an agenda for future work.  
 
Preliminaries: public priority goods and public commitmentv  
 
Richard Sennett notes that “The first recorded uses of the word ‘public’ in English 
identify the ‘public’ with the common good in society” (1977: 16). His The Fall of 
Public Man (1977) analyses the evolution of public life in 18th-19th century European 
capitals, especially Paris and London. During the growth of these cities many public 
spaces were lost, to the special detriment of poorer people, as part of growing 
privatization of both physical and mental space. A countermovement slowly emerged 
to try to establish worthwhile public spaces open to all. Nussbaum’s book gives much 
attention to the successful realization of public parks in some cities and their 
disastrous absence in others. The nature and extent of public spaces in cities 
provides powerful visible evidence about how far people consider themselves as part 
of the same society. Inclusive cities have important public areas and promote an 
experience of living together; exclusive cities separate people, promote individuality 
and further the isolation of individuals. Spatial inequalities reinforce economic ones 
and deepen social distance, which in turn weakens social cooperation and feelings of 
publicness among individuals, eroding what Sennett (2012) called ‘the cooperative 
frame of mind’. 
 John Gray notes that public spaces are examples of what Joseph Raz (1986) 
called ‘inherently public goods’, which  
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do not necessarily satisfy the technical requirements of an economic public good … 
[but] are ingredients in a worthwhile form of common life. Consider public parks in 
the context of a modern city… There are, of course, no insuperable technical 
obstacles to turning urban parks into private consumption goods… [But] Public spaces 
for recreation and for lingering, whether streets, squares or parks, are necessary 
ingredients in the common life of cities, as conceived in the European tradition and 
elsewhere. Where such public places atrophy or disappear, become too dangerous or 
too unsightly to be occupied… the common life of the city has been compromised or 
lost. (Gray, 1993: 134). 
Other work in social philosophy, such as by Abram de Swaan (1988), similarly rejects 
the conception in which a ‘public good’ is merely a good which does not well fit into 
the operation of private markets; and presents instead a notion of public priority 
good (see Wuyts 1992). In the same spirit, the India Exclusion Report (CES 2014) 
defines a ‘basic public good’ as a requisite for a life with dignity. 
“Public is a pre-governmental concept which broadly describes the full range 
of human collective activities which are outside of our private homes and distinct 
from the market of the private pursuit of gain” (Frederickson, 1996: 299). The 
concept comes from the Latin publicus, derived in turn from pubes meaning adult. It 
has now a complex of meanings including these three as an adjective (Oxford 
English Reference Dictionary, 1996): (1) of or concerning the people as a whole, (2) 
of or involved in the affairs of the community, and (3) provided by or concerning 
local or central government—but provided not for government itself, instead for the 
whole public. Concomitantly, ‘public goods’ are not only provided by the State. Thus, 
the concept of ‘public’ means that which is and/or appropriately should be managed 
or held in common and for the common good. People declare that issue X is a matter 
of public concern, meaning it should be subject to community attention and steering 
even if it presently is not; and conversely that issue Y is not, meaning it should not 
be a matter for community regulation even if it presently is. Different views about 
the grounds for ‘should’ and about the ‘common good’ lead to different views about 
which things are public goods and what is the appropriate extent of public action. 
Whatever the specific view, the provision of public goods depends on a commitment 
to these goods as priorities for the common good. 
 Mainstream economics has historically focused on the market. ‘Private goods’, 
those that are rivalrous and excludable, fit its predictive and prescriptive claims about 
markets better.vi In neo-classical economics public goods are the problem cases that 
fit poorly in markets: goods which are non-rivalrous and/or non-excludable. The pure 
public good (or bad) is both those, so ‘free-riding’ is possible, and funding and hence 
provision of the good are inhibited. Such goods are not public in the sense of being 
automatically publicly available. What makes such a good publicly available, and 
hence a public good in an everyday sense, is (a) a decision that it is important 
enough and then (b) some form of public action.vii What is chosen for actual public 
provision covers far less than all non-excludables, and includes some excludables. 
Education and health care are both rivalrous and excludable services; yet both may 
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be supported or provided by public agents to be accessible to ordinary people, often 
through a subsidy, because they are seen as ‘merit goods’, deserving priority, and 
because their ‘consumption’ brings important favourable external effects for others.  
  
TABLE 1:  CONCEPTS OF HUMAN SECURITY, HUMAN NEED, AND HUMAN RIGHTS  
(Adapted from Gasper 2005) 
 
 Basic 
Criterion for 
Priority/Need 
Needs level 1: 
Requirements 
in order to 
fulfil the basic 
criterion  
 
Needs level 2: 
Satisfier 
characteristics 
required to 
achieve level 1 
 
Needs level 3: 
Specific 
required 
satisfiers to 
achieve level 2 
 
Needs level 4: 
Required 
preconditions 
for level 3 
 
Human Security 
/ Human 
Development: 
prioritization using 
the categories of the 
capability approach 
and UNDP’s ‘Human 
Development’ 
 
Priority 
functionings: 
‘vital core’ of 
human lives 
(CHS 2003) 
Capabilities that 
are required to 
achieve the 
priority 
functionings: 
‘basic 
capabilities’ 
 
‘Characteristics’ 
of goods that are 
required to 
achieve those 
capabilities  
 
The goods / 
‘commodities’ 
that are required 
to provide those 
characteristics 
The societal 
conditions that 
are required to 
sustain the 
supply of those 
goods  
Theory of Human 
Need  
Doyal & Gough’s 
main formulation of 
human needs as 
normative priorities 
Avoidance of 
serious harm; 
and ability to 
function as an 
effective full 
member of 
society  
 
Health, physical 
and mental; 
autonomy of 
agency 
Nourishment; 
housing;  
secure  
-childhood &  
-environment;  
work; health 
care, education, 
&c. 
The satisfiers 
required, which  
vary according to 
geographical, 
socio-economic 
and cultural 
setting 
Conditions 
concerning 
production, 
reproduction, 
cultural 
transmission, 
and political 
authority 
Human Rights: 
Goldewijk & 
Fortman’s 
formulation  
Dignity / non-
humiliation 
  
Self-respect  
Equality and 
freedom; or, 
equality and 
agency 
The satisfier 
characteristics 
required for 
equality and 
freedom/agency 
Specific satisfiers 
that provide the 
required 
characteristics; 
vary by setting 
A culture of 
commitment to 
the dignity of all 
persons 
Education example  
The more ambitious 
the generative/basic 
value-criterion (e.g. 
critical autonomy 
too), the more 
ambitious will be the 
type of required 
education, & the 
greater the 
supportive requisites 
 
E.g.:- 
A life of human 
dignity and 
compassion 
 
1 - Literacy, 
numeracy, etc. = 
Learning to know 
2 – Operacy; 
autonomy of 
agency =  
Learning to do 
3 - Learning to be 
4 - Learning to 
live together. 
(The four 
UNESCO ‘Pillars 
of Learning’) 
 
Competent 
schooling 
 
Good parenting 
 
&c. 
 
Accessible school 
facilities 
 
Competent 
motivated 
humane teachers 
&c. 
 
Family incomes 
that free children 
from long 
working hours 
 
Economic 
capacity  
 
Nussbaumian 
public spirit; 
sufficient social 
solidarity to 
sustain these 
required 
satisfiers 
 
… 
 
 The public priority goods notion itself remains insufficient, for each majority 
government could declare that it prioritizes in its own way, a way that (perhaps 
tacitly) excludes some groups. The notion thus requires fuller theorization, including 
connection to needs theory, plus institutional entrenchment of basic requirements for 
all, as via a human rights formulation. Table 1 shows how a ladder of implied needs, 
of increasing specificity as we descend (from left to right in the table), derives from a 
normative priority criterion; and how needs theory (specifically Doyal and Gough’s 
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Theory of Human Need) matches the structure of thinking about human rights and 
human security, which prioritize criteria of human dignity and vital interests.  
The table illustrates a number of other important themes too. First, we need a 
more refined and systematic vocabulary than just the single concept of public goods. 
We should consider not only the culmination outcomes of publicness, but also the 
comprehensive outcomes necessary to produce them (Sen, 2002). Thus, we need to 
distinguish between, for example: values that support education, economic inputs to 
schooling, real opportunities for schooling within a given social context, actual 
presence in school, actual involvement in learning, and actual achieved learning. 
Giving attention to all levels in the table shows the relevance of a range of levels and 
types of public good. Even if capabilities are deemed the true ends in policy 
deliberations, this should be accompanied by attention to the motivations, processes 
and arrangements concerning many required public goods and their prerequisites 
too. 
Second, we noted that the language of public priority goods can be used too 
parochially, with certain groups being downgraded as supposed reflection of a 
particular society’s local values. In contrast the languages of human security, human 
development and human rights are universal not nationally-specific, and add an 
essential framework for local prioritizations. They allow local variation in detailed 
content and emphases but not local exclusion of fundamentals. For example, basic 
physical and mental health is central in the Doyal-Gough theory of need, and brings 
implications such as in regard to reproductive health and to sanitation, as vital for 
general health and dignity.viii 
Third, public spirit can be thought of as a special type of public good that is 
needed for the provision of most/many other public goods. It is hinted at in Doyal 
and Gough’s preconditions level, and becomes explicit in work such as Nussbaum’s. 
Many elements of culture, such as a public framework for respectful and systematic 
deliberation, are priority public goods. Personal capabilities rest in important degree 
on public goods provision; which in turn rests on appropriate institutional 
arrangements that themselves rely on, and sustain, compatible public sentiments. 
 
The Rawlsian, Senian and Nussbaumian dimensions of publicness 
 
Much of Amartya Sen’s work on India has been about how to organize the provision 
of basic public goods. However the stress in his theoretical work, and in the Human 
Development Reports that this helped to foster, has been on how provision of 
concrete public goods should not be taken as the true standard of achievement. In 
contrast to what we named the Rawlsian level of public goods—basic/primary 
goods—Sen focuses on the degree of effective access to valued functionings. For 
both Sen and Rawls, a question arises regarding motivational adequacy: why would 
or do participants give support and/or concede duties regarding the specified 
concerns? So we look here at the essential complementary dimension, which we 
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called the Nussbaumian level or dimension: the culture and attitudes—including of 
civility, tolerance, non-violence, mutual respect and solidarity—needed to sustain a 
life with dignity for all.  
 Rawls introduced in A Theory of Justice the concept of ‘publicity’, meaning “a 
knowledge of the principles that others follow” (1971: 16). This idea of shared 
knowledge was expanded on in his Political Liberalism, in relation to ‘justification’ for 
a public conception of justice that comprises a commonly shared and justified point 
of view. In a liberal society individuals do not need to agree with each other’s 
comprehensive doctrines nor do they have to hide their beliefs under a common 
point-of-view. Rather, they adjudicate disagreements by openly arguing in favour of 
their convictions in terms that others could potentially agree with. This ‘reasoning 
together’ is central to Rawls’s vision of public reason, mutual respect and cooperation 
in ‘a well-ordered society’. 
 In Justice as Fairness Rawls emphasises that his idea of public reason applies 
only to matters of “constitutional essentials and questions of basic justice” (2001: 
91), excluding issues like ‘tax legislation’, ‘environmental legislation’ and ‘laws 
regulating property’ among others. He distinguishes between a ‘constitutional stage’ 
and a ‘legislative stage’. Larmore (2003: 381) notes that “Political debate rightly 
shows a greater mix of voices in areas of society other than the circumscribed realm 
of public reason, and it would be wrong to suppose that Rawls’s theory of public 
reason means to encompass the ‘public sphere’ in this broader sense”. In contrast, 
Sen proclaims a much wider role of public reason, not restricted to specifying a 
constitution. 
If we wish to apply Rawls’s concepts of publicity and public reason in the 
domains of human development, we need a broader understanding of mutual 
respect, reasonableness, reciprocity, justification and shared principles, not restricted 
to a constitutional stage. We need a concept such as publicness that encompasses 
processes in which citizens can arrive at binding decisions and also includes 
‘background culture’ elements. Rawls himself frequently used the concepts of 
‘reasonableness’ and ‘reciprocity’ as ways to circumvent the limited scope of his 
concept of public reason. He never sufficiently establishes though why participants in 
his system would pay serious respect to public reasoning and, fundamentally, treat 
each other as of equal moral worth. He argues, “We develop a desire to apply and to 
act upon the principles of justice once we realize how social arrangements answering 
to them have promoted our good and that of those with whom we are affiliated.” 
(1971: 474). But acceptance of such ‘affiliation’ involves more than just recognition 
of interdependence; for example, people depend on their physical environment and 
know this, but that does not mean they accept the environment as an agent that 
deserves moral recognition and has ethically binding rights. A feeling of affiliation 
with others requires further elements of psychological preparedness (Newman, 
2015). 
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In The Idea of Justice Sen argues (2009: viii) that “A sense of injustice could 
serve as a signal that moves us, but a signal does demand critical examination, and 
there has to be some scrutiny of the soundness of a conclusion based mainly on 
signals”. Moral sentiments, such as frustration and ire, provide a starting point but 
need reasoned scrutiny, for us to understand and test with impartiality and 
objectivity the grounds for the indignation. For Sen, public reason involves judgment, 
in particular through impartial reasoning that can help people handle their vested 
interests and preconceptions. He acknowledges as did Rawls the plurality of relevant 
values and how some irreducible conflicts between different positions can remain, 
and considers how we can respond. “Judgements about justice have to take on 
board the task of accommodating different kinds of reasons and evaluative concerns” 
(2009: 395). He argues that such reasoning can make progress despite non-
commensurability of values and the multiple types of reason.  
Sen gives emphasis to characteristics of good public reasoning such as 
impartiality and objectivity, more than to defining ‘reasonable persons’.ix His 
interpretation of Rawls’s notion of fairness, as a demand for impartiality, frees him 
from examining the existence or not of reasonable behaviour as a precondition for 
public reason. He criticises Rawls though for not being ‘realistic’ (2009: 81), in 
assuming that once institutions are in place individuals would behave reasonably, 
and warns too that: “Demanding more from behaviour today than could be expected 
to be fulfilled would not be a good way of advancing the cause of justice” (2009: 
81).  
 Sen seems more concerned with informational issues and how different 
arguments can survive objective reasoned scrutiny than with trying to change 
people’s moral sentiments, at any rate directly. “To prevent catastrophes caused by 
human negligence or callous obduracy, we need critical scrutiny, not just goodwill 
towards others” (Sen 2009: 48). He emphasises good public reasoning, even when 
there is no change in individuals’ emotions. His arguments for using social choice 
theory as a framework for public reasoning do not depend on criteria about 
reasonable values; instead he delves into the informational limitations that a 
complete theory of justice, such as Rawls’s, inevitably encounters. Thus, Sen 
engages with Rawls’s earlier concept of publicity as shared knowledge (necessary for 
shared communication and understanding) and his later characterization of 
justification in Political Liberalism; much more than with the psychological and moral 
principles that are needed to produce and give some stability to public reason itself. 
Yet if, as he argues, “justice is partly a relation in which ideas of obligation to each 
other are important” (2009: 129), we should address how values of reciprocity and 
of recognition of each other’s equal moral worth are formed. In Sen’s hands this 
becomes a cognitive challenge about open impartiality and objectivity. He notes that 
a person’s objectives can go well beyond self-interest but he prefers to focus on the 
plurality of possible reasons without settling for any specific motivating moral 
sentiment. There is nothing irrational in being concerned with others, he shows, but 
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he does not seem to insist that there is an obligation to be concerned, including for 
sake of one’s own psychological health (Gasper 2007).  
 Sen prefers to focus on the issue of responsibility and cooperation, leaving 
open the possibility of plural justifications of reasonable behaviour (either based on 
self-interested mutual cooperation or on feelings of responsibility and duty towards 
others) rather than settling for a particular version. By using the concept of 
‘agency’—which “encompasses all the goals that a person has reasons to adopt” 
(2009: 287)—he builds a framework that includes a plurality of motivations (of which 
reasonableness can be one, but not ‘the’ one) rather than settling on one specific 
notion of reasonableness or reciprocity as the basis of individuals’ sense of values. 
The adequacy of his approach depends on whether or not we actually need some 
shared human values for achieving kinds of public reasoning that are conducive to 
just arrangements.  
 Nussbaum disputes that the ideas of agreement and justifiability can sustain a 
notion of the good sufficient for a theory of justice. She criticises Rawls’s 
contractarianism for having a very narrow moral psychology that excludes 
motivations such as compassion, sympathy or benevolence (2006: 108, 148, 158). 
She advocates a shared public conception of the person,x and proposes to replace 
Rawls’s idea of mutual advantage by an idea of equal human dignity within a “richer 
and moralized account of the good” (2006: 163).xi Her argument is that people’s 
notions of the good should (and do) include other people, and not for the reason 
that a person might feel better when doing charity or would gain some advantage 
from caring for others. Respecting each other’s dignity is a question of our love of 
others. “It can only be out of our attachment to justice and our love of others, our 
sense that our lives are intertwined with theirs and that we share ends with them.” 
(2006: 222).  
 
Nussbaum’s Political Emotions xii 
 
All values require an emotional basis for them to be stable and to connect to action 
(Nussbaum 2013: 127). Securing a stable basis for commitments that concern other 
people is especially necessary. How for example, asks Nussbaum, could the project 
of the European Union acquire a sufficient motivational base amongst ordinary 
people (p.222)? Political Emotions asks how a liberal theory of justice can cohere; 
how can one, without imposing illiberal restrictions, ensure that individuals will pay 
attention to a common good? She sees a corresponding gap in Rawls’ Theory of 
Justice, even though “Rawls…knows well that human beings do not automatically 
pursue the common good” (2013: 9).  
 She rejects as illiberal a family of responses that involve indoctrination plus 
enforcement to ensure solidarity or at least obedience to practices of solidarity; for 
example Rousseau’s advocacy of a ‘civil religion’ that would, in his words, inculcate 
the “sentiments of sociability without which it is impossible to be a good citizen or a 
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faithful subject” (cited on p.5). Implicitly she rejects the contemporary equivalents in 
East Asia. Indeed she rejects Rousseau’s General Will doctrine, on grounds that it 
has insufficient respect for individuals (p.45). Further, it can accompany a type of 
overriding nationalism and conduce to lack of respect for other nations and 
individuals. We ask later whether Political Emotions’ own nation-centred conception 
avoids nationalism’s pitfalls. 
 She is more sympathetic towards Auguste Comte’s and especially J.S. Mill’s 
calls for a ‘religion of humanity’ to ensure a sufficient basis of altruism, and 
Rabindranath Tagore’s similar call for a ‘religion of man’. Comte’s model for 
promotion of ‘civic love’ for fostering the common good, a sort of obligatory 
humanistic state religion in the mould of Catholicism but intended to replace it, leant 
too far in her view towards imposing feelings of obedience, hierarchy and 
homogeneity. She draws inspiration instead from Mozart, Mill and Tagore on how 
moral sentiments of general sympathy, equal respect, toleration and fellow-feeling, 
and deeper emotions such as compassion and altruism, can be promoted: including 
through arts, education, urban design, and style and content of leadership. Each of 
these can advance sympathetic awareness of other people. While some violations of 
core political values, such as racial discrimination, should be coercively prevented, 
the main focus of her proposals is within a liberal tradition, to non-coercively educate 
people and their emotions.  
 She does not agree that impartiality and objectivity in public reason suffice for 
appropriate behaviour. Reason and even respectxiii are not enough to connect 
people, unlike emotions.xiv “Rational deduction alone will not tell us whether women 
are full-fledged human beings” (2013: 261). Only through emotions, she argues, can 
individuals examine their lives and connect with each other, gaining a sense of a 
common fate and publicness stronger than implied by Rawls and Sen (2013: 345). 
Indeed, beyond what they suggested, human development needs a fuller set of ideas 
about what is good and bad. She holds that there is nothing illiberal about this 
provided that dissent is protected. Senian values of impartiality and objectivity must 
rest on empathy and sympathy with others; Rawlsian reasonableness requires 
specific psychological bases (Newman 2015). Nussbaum, like Newman, tries 
therefore to explain what shapes individuals’ commitment to public reason. She looks 
specifically at the ‘malleability of the moral sentiments’ and how we can upgrade, 
within the limits of liberalism, individuals’ emotional life towards others.  
 Political Emotions is dedicated to how decent societies should cultivate 
appropriate public emotions. Calls to respect the dignity of every human do not 
suffice to overcome inherited and newly created beliefs that some groups are 
disgusting (p.380). Nussbaum proposes that “all of the core emotions that sustain a 
decent society have their roots in, or are forms of, love—by which I mean intense 
[benevolent] attachments to things outside the control of our will” (2013: 15). For 
public emotions—attitudes towards other people whom one does not know 
personally or closely—to themselves be stable, and stable sustainers, they need to be 
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part of a love of humanity in its finitude and particularities, that transcends any 
shame and disgust at being human, feelings which too often become projected onto 
others. Here Nussbaum sees her work as advancing beyond Comte and Mill, Rawls or 
Sen or Habermas, and even Tagore, for she theorizes “the link between overcoming 
disgust and broadening sympathy” (p.105). To understand limited sympathy and to 
counteract it requires existential investigation beyond mere recognition of the 
existence of a plurality of narrowly-concerned agents. We must give attention to 
negative emotions, including anger, shame and hatred. As discussed in her pivotal 
Chapter 7, these emotions derive from humans’ long early years of self-absorbed 
conscious helplessness; also from, as remarked by Kant, our greater tendency 
compared to other species towards self-importance, hurtful comparisons with our 
fellows and “competitive self-love” (p.166); and from our in-group socialization which 
builds identity and in-group commitment partly through vilification of an out-group or 
groups. Ideally, gradually the loving attention of parent-figures builds a child’s 
recognition, trust, and concern for others, and her confidence in her ability to 
reciprocate, and reduces her felt insecurities. However, “the dynamics in human life 
that made love necessary (helplessness, fear and anger at helplessness) are not 
[fully or once-for-all] removed by time and growth, but persist—and thus love is an 
ongoing necessity for the personality in adult interactions” (p.190). 
 While we traditionally invoke fraternité as necessary third term from the 1789 
rallying cry, Nussbaum suggests this sort of masculine idiom contains a potential 
trap.xv Her analysis of The Marriage of Figaro draws out the need and possibility for 
something more feminine, ‘nicer’, less oriented to competitive pride, status and 
domination. Her proposed solution inside nations, perhaps even outside them, 
centres on ‘love’; by this she seems to mean empathy plus sympathy and generosity, 
‘love’ in a somewhat Christian sense (cf. p.43).xvi Its attentive generous 
reciprocation, explored in Chapter 7, is not to be equated with ‘being in love’. 
 Nussbaum stresses that the central importance of public emotions for 
solidarity does not imply that people should have completely the same values. First, 
a distinction is necessary between each individual’s full set of ethical principles and 
the shared principles they endorse for the political sphere in order to avoid dictatorial 
regimes. Second, “Political emotions are the real emotions of real people; because 
people are heterogeneous, having different opinions, histories, and personalities, 
they can be expected to love, mourn, laugh, and strive for justice in specific and 
personal ways – particularly if their freedom of expression is protected and valued, 
as it is here” (2013: 382-3). Third, our minds are ‘particularistic’ and our emotions 
depend on the connections we have with people who belong to our ‘circle of 
concern’. But the histories that partly define circles of concern are substantially 
shared within and partly specific to national societies: “What moves people is a 
function of their sense of their nation’s history, traditions and current problems” 
(2013: 200), as she illustrates from the oratory of Lincoln and Martin Luther King. 
This last point implies great challenges. 
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 To extend our feelings of concern beyond those to whom we are directly 
connected—and to include within a ‘we’ some others whom we do not personally 
know—requires, she argues, the mediation of “symbols and poetry” (p.11). Art can 
help to convey both a tragic perspective that “gives insight into shared 
vulnerabilities”, and a comic perspective that accepts the chances and peculiarities 
“of human existence with flexibility and mercy, rather than hatred” (2013: 21).xvii 
Vitally, all societies need formats—including the arts of tragedy and more—that 
channel grief “in ways that promote reciprocity and extended, rather than narrow 
compassion” (p.201), ways that lead us to have not only self-pity but sympathy for 
others too; and formats—including the comic arts—that restrain disgust, “lest it 
become an impediment to general concern” (p.201) and be projected onto hated 
out-groups, like blacks, Arabs or Untouchables.  
 Thus, Nussbaum examines the importance and substance of public emotions 
and proposes that they can be cultivated by societies in liberal ways. Publicness too 
can be built and refined as basis for the sustenance of public emotions. By doing this 
she extends the basis of justification beyond impartiality and reason, moving the 
discussion towards specific contexts and active cultural and communication 
strategies. 
 
An initial assessment of Political Emotions  
 
Nussbaum’s treatment, within the frame of ‘political liberalism’, is oriented to look for 
institutional arrangements that allow coexistence of multiple ethical doctrines and yet 
fulfilment of the human rights of all people. She is more at home discussing art than 
the institutionalization of empathy, sympathy and solidarity in tax systems or public 
sanitation. She does discuss urban planning, though mainly with reference to public 
monuments and parks. Still, she is well aware that “a decent tax system, for 
example, could represent the insights of a duly balanced and appropriately impartial 
compassion” (2013: 20), and that “tax and welfare policies…embody sympathy, but 
in a way that is more stable and less prone to special pleading than is sympathy in 
[daily interpersonal] life” (2013: 135).  
We do not look to a humanistic philosopher to go deep into the specifics of 
institutionalization, but can gain necessary insights and tools. Let us sketch an 
assessment then with attention more on building blocks of her analysis: the ideas 
about moral sentiments, and her strong commitments to liberalism and a nation-
state framework. First, Nussbaum sometimes takes liberalism as a normative praise 
term, not a descriptor of actual societies: “A liberal society asks people to be 
ashamed of excessive greed and selfishness” (2013: 23); but which liberal society 
does that? Her left-liberalism (cf. Fawcett 2015) has to acknowledge that really-
existing liberalism becomes illiberal in regard to weaker groups and persons, and 
needs to be bounded.  
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 Second, in regard to the moral sentiments, a comparison of Nussbaum’s work 
with that of Adam Smith and earlier philosophers is needed, though that requires 
another paper. Suffice it to say that she shares many features seen in Smith and 
others: stresses on the plurality of moral sentiments, the importance of context, and 
the ongoing struggles to formulate and balance different emotions, as part of 
reasoning about living. (See also Nussbaum 1995, 2001.) The struggles never end, 
regardless of how much Mozart, Tagore and dance-drama one imbibes.  
 We look here instead at how Nussbaum’s notions of moral sentiments relate to 
contemporary psychological research as reviewed in Jonathan Greene’s Moral Tribes. 
Greene distinguishes two fundamental issues. The first concerns the bases for 
morality within a group: the issue of ‘Me versus Us’, as in The Tragedy of the 
Commons; members’ selfishness versus concern for others. This is the problem that 
our moral brains evolved to solve. Greene writes that our brains contain responses to 
the group weakness that would be produced in relation to other groups if our group 
failed to cooperate internally. Various mechanisms encourage principled cooperation, 
such as cultures of group loyalty (Chapter 2). 
The second issue, ‘Us versus Them’, concerns clashes of our group’s interests 
and values with those of another group or groups. Our established solutions for the 
Me versus Us problem—including loyalty to our group, its declared symbols and 
mores—can exacerbate the second problem (Chapter 3). Greene speaks therefore of 
The Tragedy of Commonsense Morality. Besides mechanisms of biased perception 
and communication, seen in all disputes, that lead us to focus on our own 
grievances, here the group loyalties feed conflicts. We internalize sheer preference 
for our own ‘tribe’ and commitment to its declared distinctive values and the icons 
that supposedly embody them (particular places, persons, traditions, narratives); we 
embrace certain beliefs and stories about the past that become badges of ‘tribe’ 
membership and loyalty and so cannot be abandoned; and we acquire loyalties to 
particular doctrines about justice, which makes negotiated compromise harder for 
that would be to deviate from one’s beliefs about justice.  
Nussbaum illustrates this sort of trade-off from Finland, where the acceptance 
of high and progressive taxation reflects, she considers, the strong intra-group 
bonding possible in a small country (2013: 345). The relevant conducive factor is 
perhaps homogeneity more than smallness, for a large country like Japan displays 
similar intra-group bonding. Finland’s homogeneity and internal bonding contribute 
to fear of in-migrants and asylum seekers; the same seems to apply for Japan.  
 Much of what Political Emotions describes matches Green’s ‘Commonsense 
Morality’, notably various forms of quasi-religion concerning the nation, which can 
serve to exacerbate inter-group and inter-national conflict. Some of what she 
describes does not match that, and seeks to transcend such conflicts. So, thirdly, we 
need to review and assess her presumption and endorsement of a nation-state 
frame.  
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 Nussbaum adopts Mazzini’s optimistic 19th century claim that the nation is the 
necessary focus for transcending self-concern, and the unavoidable stepping-stone 
towards global concerns.xviii It is “the largest unit we know until now that is decently 
accountable to people’s voices…” (p.17). Further, she frequently lauds patriotism, 
love of country, and adopts the theory that “when national love focuses on ideals of 
inclusion and human dignity, such love can easily lead on to a struggle for these 
things everywhere” (p.235). There is a Scandinavian grain of truth in this hypothesis, 
but unfortunately many counterexamples too: internally inclusive nations which 
remain resolutely self-obsessed. Further, a notion of the nation as that which brings 
a heritage to which all its members are indebted, which in fact has produced them, 
and which provides a horizon of opportunity to which they all can contribute, applies 
more validly to the world as a whole. (It applies also for cities and localities.)  
The book’s dominant categories are those of the age of nations, in which in 
many respects the world indeed remains. In other respects, as citizens of advanced 
globalized capitalism in the Anthropocene age, we are long past the nation as 
sufficient frame for our analyses and our moral imagination. Political Emotions 
functions mainly as an American text for an intended American audience, as seen 
throughout its final chapter. Even its closing paragraphs are exclusively nation-
focused. It needs to be read together with Nussbaum’s earlier cosmopolitan studies. 
 Nussbaum’s analysis goes deeper than Greene’s by exploring emotional 
sources and contents, not least the emotions of disgust. Our next section, on India, 
looks at the issue of disgust targeted at ‘outsider’ groups within a country; and the 
following section considers nationalism versus internationalism, and the languages of 
political emotion that are needed to build international cooperation, including to 
counter disgust targeted at other countries, a theme on which Political Emotions is 
surprisingly relatively silent.  
 
India’s Challenge 
 
While Political Emotions includes much rich discussion of Indian themes and figures, 
there are sometimes uneasy links between its framework and these materials. “The 
focus of this project will be on the role of emotions in advancing a society that is 
already pretty good to fuller social justice” (p.136.) India though continues to display 
dismayingly low levels of publicness. The message from Comim’s composite index 
mentioned earlier is corroborated in surveys of Indian human development such as 
by Drèze and Sen (2013) and the India Exclusion Reports (CES, 2014, 2016). The 
Exclusion Reports focus on the Rawlsian level of public goods and who gains access 
to them, as part of an agenda of holding the state accountable. Drèze and Sen focus 
on the levels of effective access to priority functionings and corresponding satisfiers, 
for example facilities and practices for basic sanitation. Half of the households in 
India still practiced open defecation in 2011 (Drèze and Sen, 2013: 63), six or seven 
times the proportion in Bangladesh.  
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 We saw that required for sustained provision of priority public goods, for 
effective access, and for activism that succeeds to hold the state accountable on 
behalf of everyone and not only mobilised privileged partisan groups, are public 
values of solidarity. Nussbaum refers frequently to “our tendency to feel disgust 
toward bodily fluids” (2013: 114), and of how this is counteracted or not. An equal or 
greater problem concerns our solid excreta, and this problem is definitive of Indian 
social organization and of challenges India continues to face. Her Chapter 7 
describes how we may project onto groups of other people our disgust at excreta 
and mortality, by associating those groups inseparably with such products and with 
corpses, human and/or animal. In India this tendency was built into a social system. 
A “disgust-ridden way of life…is not very promising as a basis for a political 
community” (p.141); notably the “disgusted repudiation of mortality itself, and [of] 
the body as its seat” (p.160). 
 India presents a hard case for the approach advocated in Political Emotions. 
The book gives extended attention to the thoughts of Rabindranath Tagore, 
Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru. It extols the norms of material modesty that 
they bequeathed to some of privileged India. Those norms have withered, and were 
never accompanied in most of the country by operational basic rights for all. Chapter 
8 has a section on the Untouchables’ (Dalits’) great spokesman B.R. Ambedkar, and 
records the problems that Dalits continue to face rather than solutions via political 
liberalism and liberal arts. In higher education, Nussbaum thinks the legal 
infrastructure has been created, and attributes failures in integration to ‘the 
social/emotional support structure of government [education] institutions’ (p.371). 
Ambedkar (1949) had warned that “Without fraternity, equality and liberty will be no 
deeper than coats of paint.” 
 The subject of sanitation in particular could need the enlightenment of both 
tragic and comic art. But neither seems to provide sufficient traction in the setting of 
India. Similarly, the question arises whether political liberalism, built in Europe and 
America, is enough for India. Will public sanitation in India, for example, only be 
achieved if adopted by a neo-Hindu modernization agenda and set of sentiments? 
Each country has its peculiar path. 
 Wuyts (1992) summarizes how richer groups in 19th century Europe’s 
expanding cities, increasingly residentially secluded by income, paid private 
entrepreneurs who installed water and sanitation systems for their neighbourhoods. 
Eventually however these public goods were extended to low-income areas by 
legislation and State subsidy, given the richer groups’ wish to eliminate epidemics 
that endangered and inconvenienced them too, and the growth of concern from 
increasingly organized medical and State bureaucracies and wider public opinion. In 
contrast in mid-20th century South Africa, richer groups responded to insanitary low-
income areas not by extending public provision to them but, from the 1930s 
onwards, by forced removal of their populations to remote townships. In Europe, the 
middle and upper classes evidently could imagine that misfortunes might happen to 
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them too. In India, as in apartheid South Africa, not all of the elements of tragic art 
emphasized by Nussbaum seem actively present: that the audience should come to 
feel that the characters whom they watch suffer misfortunes that are major but 
which are largely not the characters’ fault, that these misfortunes are avoidable 
and/or remediable, and that similar misfortunes could plausibly happen also to 
members of the audience. Attention and sympathy in India, let alone action, are not 
sufficiently triggered. The option of ‘Looking Away’ prevails (Mander 2015). 
 India, a continental-scale country of over a billion people stretching from 
amongst the richest in the world through to almost half of its poorest, is in some 
ways a microcosm for the world as a whole. What Indian elites allow to happen is 
comparable to what global elites allow to happen on the global scale. India has no 
single ‘Us’, except perhaps in the context of rivalry and conflict with a competitor 
nation. Its Dalit intellectuals reject as hypocritical the symbols of national unity 
provided by Indian elites. We come to the questions of how far the apparatus of 
national pride and commitment which Political Emotions gives such weight to 
suffices, whether nationalism is a dead-end (in all senses) in a shared world, and 
what are the possible alternatives or supplements. 
 
Global challenges  
 
Nussbaum’s book proposes the elements of a national society founded in justice. She 
aims to complete Rawls’s mid-20th century intellectual project and the projects of 
Rousseau, Comte et al. from earlier centuries. When Comte and Mill spoke of ‘the 
religion of humanity’ they meant a secular replacement for Christianity, in a world of 
nation-states. Like Mazzini, Mill presumed that nationalism’s downsides were readily 
tameable, in a brotherhood of democratic peoples (Mazower 2013). In his declared 
long-term aims he was cosmopolitan, if not in his 35-year career as a senior British 
East India Company colonial administrator (Lal 1998). 
 Is this project, for well-ordered national societies, sufficient for the interwoven 
and seething globe of the 21st century, with its swelling ‘public bads’ and huge 
global public goods deficits? Nussbaum has elsewhere affiliated her perspective to 
the human rights tradition, but Political Emotions contains little or no discussion of 
that global agenda; nor are sister enterprises like the Earth Charter mentioned. While 
she frequently quotes Walt Whitman, especially his “Song of Myself”—in which “I will 
accept nothing which all cannot have their counterpart of on the same terms” (cited 
on p.296), she presumes that he proclaimed an ideal for America. She does not 
highlight his cosmopolitan declaration: “One thought ever at the fore — / That in the 
Divine Ship, the World, breasting Time and Space, / All peoples of the globe together 
sail, sail the same voyage, / Are bound to the same destination.” 
 Nussbaum repeats classic arguments that particularist loyalties—here 
patriotism—are inevitable and also necessary in order to give our loyalties sufficient 
strength to motivate cooperative action. Following Aristotle, she claims 
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cosmopolitanism offers merely ‘watery motivation’ (p. 219). Following Mazzini, she 
says ordinary people need a local focus (p.209); yet her main cases, the USA and 
India, are continental-scale countries. She admits that Martin Luther King himself 
intended the phrase “all God’s children” to imply what it says, a global scale of 
concern (p.239) but holds that few Americans accept that; likewise for Gandhi 
(p.242). She doesn’t directly address the question whether a local loyalty needs to be 
exclusive; does ‘love of the nation’ (p.313) exclude love of many nations or love for 
them all?xix But she warns that any eschewing of the heritage and symbols of 
patriotism would leave cosmopolitan forces hopelessly politically marginalized 
(p.256). So, in the world as it has evolved, with its longstanding locally accepted 
stories of each local group’s great contributions and/or unjustified sufferings, we 
could now be stuck with nationalism. 
She frequently repeats Mazzini’s mid-19th century argument that nationalism 
forms a necessary and serviceable emotional bridge beyond the self and the locality, 
leading eventually to commitment to the world as a whole, a hypothesis much 
battered by the 20th century. Political Emotions’ longest chapter, entitled 
“Compassion’s Enemies: Fear, Envy, Shame”, does not include Nationalism in that 
list. Yet nationalism is imbricated with each of those enemies and is an additional 
underminer of compassion. It condones different standards for one’s own cause; its 
prideful love suppresses many truths about oneself and others, and promotes 
contemptuous distortions about the others. Nussbaum does recognize this, and 
elsewhere notes how J.G. Herder (1744-1803) rejected the crude patriotism and 
masculinist blood lust that fed into wars (p.47ff.); but she holds that those problems 
are avoidable (p.212). ‘Compassion’s Enemies’ stresses that love tends to be 
particularistic, limited by or to person or group-specific loyalties (p.318); its 
subsequent discussion calls only for concern within the nation. The chapter 
concludes with the assertion that “we cannot uproot particularism without uprooting 
love itself” (p.376). An earlier chapter is devoted to ‘Teaching Patriotism’.  
 Some elements of the book take us further than this, through the words of 
two figures who in the 1940s clearly stepped beyond the frame of the 17th to 19th-
century project which Rawls later continued, and moved to a more global frame: F.D. 
Roosevelt and Jawaharlal Nehru. Nussbaum cites their words but does not seem here 
to follow through their full spirit. Nehru‘s great independence speech, ‘A tryst with 
destiny’, expounded commitment to not only the new India, and the tasks that 
awaited it, but to all humanity, in a now indivisibly interknit world: 
These dreams are for India, but they are also for the world, for all the nations and 
peoples are too closely knit together today for any one of them to imagine that it can 
live apart. Peace has been said to be indivisible, so is freedom, so is prosperity now, 
and so also is disaster in this one world that can no longer be split into isolated 
fragments.  (Nehru, 1947; cited by Nussbaum 2013: 247). 
Roosevelt, responding to the obligations of the leading power in this interknit 
world, adopted a firmly global language and scope. The paralysis of his legs, which 
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had struck him in the prime of life, had empowered his compassion. He took the 
American language of freedoms and extended it, to include positive freedoms—real 
capacities to achieve valued outcomes—and to apply it worldwide. Nussbaum notes 
how Roosevelt insisted, against his advisers, that his 1941 “Four Freedoms” State of 
the Union speech should extend his vision of basic human freedoms to apply to the 
whole globe. He paired the rethinking of freedom with a rethinking of fear and 
security. Security now meant the secure achievement of four basic freedoms: 
freedom of speech, freedom of worship, freedom from want, and freedom from fear, 
not the last only. The final two in particular were interdependent. Conflict and fear 
can directly undermine prosperity, and undermine concern for others. Fear frequently 
weakens also the ability to learn about and understand others, thus indirectly 
undermining societal cooperation. Nussbaum provides a local example: “When fear 
dominated [University of Chicago] thinking, impeding inclusive sympathy, steps were 
taken that made things less safe as well as less hospitable” (p.338). This perspective, 
at a global scale, became foundational in the United Nations system founded in 
1945, incorporated in its themes of human rights and human security. These offer a 
framework for mutual respectful awareness, inclusive sympathy, and prudence and 
compassion in action (Jolly et al., 2009). 
  Human security thinking emphasises the logic of (global) public goods—the 
logics of the public sanitation system and global environmental change—that there 
can be no security in one neighbourhood alone. It can also help to motivate 
cooperation to supply and maintain public goods, by its promotion of perception of 
human co-membership in a global socio-ecological system. Public goods provision 
cannot be reduced solely to calculations of self-interest, otherwise free-riding by 
selfishly calculating participants can destroy the system. As we saw, stable and 
sufficient provision of public goods rests also on public spiritedness: pride in and 
commitment to the collectivity. Authors like Joseph Stiglitz and Nicholas Stern, who 
helped to build a reductionist economics of public goods, now fall back on the spirit 
of universal human rights and “the vision, communication and organisation of Gandhi 
and Mandela” (Stern 2010: 183), when seeking to imbue motivation to act against 
climate change (see Gasper 2013). 
 The public and political emotions needed for the 21st century should support 
global citizenship, not just the national projects of previous centuries. Greene warns 
us that many solutions to Problem I, the tension between public duty and self-
interest within a group, exacerbate Problem II, the conflicts of interest between 
different groups. Solving problem I by nationalism (solving Me v. Us by emphasizing 
Us v. Them) condemns us to not solve problem II. Harder still is Problem III, the 
issue of regulating and managing entry to the group. Rawls avoided discussing 
migration and refugees, including by suggesting that out-migration only arises if a 
country’s State has culpably failed.xx The clash between East European immigration 
and the expectations generated by English nationalism seems to have destabilized 
the arrangements for dealing with problem II within and via the European Union. At 
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play too are emotions of fear and disgust in relation to (potential) refugees and 
migrants. The metaphor of knitting, of identities and emotions, becomes central for 
the economically and environmentally interknit world of hyper-modernity. It is an old 
image, which Nussbaum notes in Aristophanes’ Lysistrata set in the context of 
wartime 5th century BC Athens. The metaphor referred to linking Athens’ different 
classes and groups, including immigrants and foreign denizens, to create a strong 
society. Nationalist forms of knitting ease Problem I but by stoking Problems II and 
III. We need, as Nussbaum suggests while commenting on Chicago’s Millennium 
Park, cultural, organizational and architectural forms that promote “a love of diversity 
in one’s fellow citizens, and a sense that diversity is a source of pleasure, not of 
anxiety” (2013: 300). 
 
Conclusion and lines for further work 
 
Much work tries to illuminate empathy, sympathy and their absence (see e.g. 
Krznaric 2015) but much less connects this to public goods. This essay reflected on 
public goods’ provision or neglect and the connection to issues of publicness. It 
recognized that public attitudes involve emotions and perceptions, both crude and 
complex, not just arbitrary tastes or given selfish calculations. The essay can 
generate many types of further work, not least a fuller investigation and delineation 
of concepts. We conclude with an underlining of main themes and by noting some of 
the lines for further attention. 
First, public goods are essential components in human development. Public 
priority goods at a series of levels can be identified by a logic of derivation from 
normative priority principles. An underlying premise of the paper has been that what 
we consider highly developed countries are countries with higher levels of publicness, 
in the sense of both public goods provision and the associated public spirit. We can 
list arguments of various natures in support of such a link; but to explore and test it 
requires research. 
Second, public-spiritedness is essential for public goods provision, operation 
and maintenance. Shrinkage of the notion of ‘public’ to that in neoclassical economics 
matches a domination of the political community by wealth (Gasper 2002), as we see 
at the world scale too. 
Third, the operative normative priorities in a society depend on the quality of 
effective concern shown by more powerful groups and majorities for their weaker 
fellows. Drèze and Sen, Mander and others document the enormous continuing 
neglect of basic public goods for the poorer half of the population in, as leading 
example, India. Mander starts to address the perceptual and emotional, as well as 
political and institutional, forces related to this absence of public concern and public 
spirit. Wider work on public sentiments should be brought into fuller conversation 
with work in and on India, notably on specifics of the struggles and debates around 
provision of particular public goods. 
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Fourth, Nussbaum’s Political Emotions goes much further in theorizing public 
spirit than do the thoughts of Mander, Rawls or Sen. It addresses gaps in the work of 
Rawls and Sen regarding motivations and how actions against (and for) injustice 
arise. She presents and uses a complex theory of emotions, to help think about the 
formation of public attitudes. Further work that could be useful includes to compare 
her arguments with those of Adam Smith on moral sentiments, and with the tradition 
of thinking about ‘the common good’. We need to also connect more concretely, in 
research and practice, such work on emotions to work on campaigns for public 
goods; we may learn, for example, from the movement for the ‘right to the city’, 
including for migrants. 
Fifth, Nussbaum’s intellectual project in Political Emotions is within the nation, 
following the framework in most Western political philosophy. She assumes here that 
the nation is the inevitable, relevant, workable framework for human life. But the 
defining challenges for the 21st century—in relation to environmental change,  
migration forced or induced by economic, environmental and demographic changes, 
and so on—involve issues of global public goods not only national public goods. 
Since, in Whitman’s words, all peoples of the globe sail in the same boat, a relevant 
model for public emotions will examine also Nussbaum’s earlier work on Stoics and 
cosmopolitanism, and connect to work on political cultures for human rights and 
human security. Roosevelt and Nehru, amongst others, foresaw the insufficiency of 
the nationally bounded imagination. The ‘solution’ of problems of national order via 
reliance on nationalism is likely to condemn us to fail on problems of global order. 
 
** 
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i Compared to its treatment of public reasoning and dialogue, Sen’s The Idea of Justice contains much less on 
commitment. Similarly, Crocker (2008) extensively lists public reason in its index but not public goods, public 
sentiments or emotions. 
ii See e.g. papers in Peter and Schmid (2007) on Sen’s concept of ‘commitment’. Commitment can be to abstract 
entities too, notably the nation; those more abstract commitments can be in tension with commitment to 
concrete others. 
iii Comim (2015) discusses what indicators we can use for trends in publicness, such as in levels of childhood 
protection, other legal protections, urban planning, public spending, homicides, etc. 
iv The composite index employed, for the Rawlsian level, public expenditure on health as % of GDP; for the 
Senian level, a blend of the under-5 mortality rate and expected years of schooling; and for the Nussbaumian 
level of how people deal with each other, the homicide rate. Despite India’s relatively low homicide rate, it 
comes bottom on the resulting composite index ratings: at 0.3 on a 0-1 scale, whereas China, Russia and Brazil 
all appear in a different universe of publicness, around 0.7; only South Africa, at around 0.4, is close.  
v Some of this section uses ideas from Gasper (2002). 
vi Rivalrousness: my consumption of a good means that you cannot consume it. Excludability: exclusion from 
access to a good can be implemented at an affordable cost. 
vii For Drèze and Sen (1989) public action is action for public benefit, which can be done by various agents, 
including private agents too.  
viii See, e.g., CES (2014) on the frequent absence of separate girls’ toilets in schools in India, and its implications. 
ix Sen (2009: 43) holds that “all of us are capable of being reasonable through being open-minded about 
welcoming information and through reflecting on arguments coming from different quarters, along with 
undertaking interactive deliberations and debates on how the underlying issues should be seen”. 
x The point is what counts as someone’s good. For Nussbaum: “The person leaves the state of nature not 
because it is more mutually advantageous to make a deal with others, but because she cannot imagine living 
well without shared ends and a shared life. Living with and toward others, with both benevolence and justice, is 
part of the shared public conception of the person that all affirm for political purposes” (2006: 158). 
xi In her words (2006: 295), “For the capabilities approach, at any rate, equality is important at the very base of 
the theory; for it is not just human dignity that must be respected, it is equal human dignity.”  
xii Nussbaum’s terminology oscillates between ‘political emotions’, the title of the book, and ‘public emotions’, 
the title of its second half. The former category is perhaps broader, encompassing also for example concerns 
for heritage and legacy; but the book does not discuss the distinction. Ch.1 rapidly adopts ‘public emotions’ 
(pp. 2, 3) and leaves the meaning of ‘political’ somewhat hazy: “all those institutions that influence people’s life 
chances pervasively and over the entire course of their lives (John Rawls’s notion of ‘the basic structure” (p.16). 
xiii She argues that (2013: 380), “Respect on its own is cold and inert, insufficient to overcome the bad 
tendencies that lead human beings to tyrannize over one another.” 
xiv “If people talk without tapping into their emotions, they often don’t really understand the depth of the 
problem, or communicate their full thinking to others.” (Nussbaum 2013: 289). “…the public culture cannot be 
tepid and passionless, if good principles and institutions are to survive: it must have enough episodes of 
inclusive love, enough poetry and music, enough access to a spirit of affection and play, that people’s attitudes 
to one another and the nation they inhabit are not mere dead routine” (2013: 320).  
xv She is herself often content though with the term ‘fraternity’ for fellow-feeling and solidarity (2013:37). 
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xvi For example: St. Paul in 1 Corinthians, 13:4-7 and 13:13. 
xvii She discusses US Government use of photographs of victims of the Great Depression to illustrate the tragic 
perspective. 
xviii P.121 claims her Frontiers of Justice provided a full defence of this presumption. See commentaries in 
Gasper (2006b, 2006c). 
xix Do any national anthems honour all humanity? Possibly only the European Union anthem, a marginal case. 
xx The index of Moral Tribes too has no mention of the basic issue of migration/immigration. 
